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ORGANIZATIONAL IRRATIONALITY AND CORPORATE 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
The problem of how to bring transnational corporations within the 
reach of international law has grown increasingly urgent for human 
rights scholars and activists.  Today, individual corporations can wield 
as much power and influence as entire nations.1  Unfortunately, that 
influence is not necessarily wielded for good, as corporations have been 
implicated in a broad range of human rights abuses.  Companies that 
engage in the extraction of natural resources, such as the Shell Group 
and Unocal, have been accused of supporting abuses such as torture, 
rape, and forced labor, and pollution resulting from their activities has 
threatened the health and livelihood of local communities.2  Labor 
practices of transnational corporations have also been a central human 
rights concern, with evidence of unsafe working conditions and physi-
cal abuses emerging from major clothing and toy companies.3 
Because international law has traditionally been limited to state ac-
tors, the literature on business and human rights largely focuses on 
whether transnational corporations can be held responsible under in-
ternational law.4  Less attention is paid to the question of what leads 
corporations to violate human rights in the first place.  When they do 
address that question, most writers assume that violations occur be-
cause corporations make rational decisions to pursue profits without 
regard to potential victims.5 
This Note aims to provide a more nuanced account of the reason 
for corporate human rights violations, drawing from social science re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
1 Cf. HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1388 
(3d ed. 2008) (“[Wal-Mart’s] 2003 sales of $256 billion made it larger than the economies of all but 
the world’s 30 richest nations.”). 
2 Radu Mares, Introduction to BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS xv, xv (Radu Mares ed., 
2004). 
3 Id. at xvi. 
4 See, e.g., Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and Interna-
tional Law: Where from Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2003); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations 
and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).  Under the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, corporations can be held accountable for direct violations of 
human rights that take place “within their area of control and sphere of influence.”  Irene Kahn, 
Sec’y Gen., Amnesty Int’l, Understanding Corporate Complicity: Extending the Notion Beyond 
Existing Laws, Speech at the Business Human Rights Seminar (Dec. 8, 2005), in STEINER ET 
AL., supra note 1, at 1389, 1390; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 
at 71–72, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).  The difficulty 
arises in attempts to hold corporations accountable when their complicity is more indirect. 
5 See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic 
Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 401, 401 (2001) (“There is tremendous profit to 
be made from abusive behavior, and in the absence of effective regulation, corporations often seek 
to maximize profit at the expense of basic rights.”). 
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search on organizational irrationality.  It may well be possible to ex-
plain many human rights violations as rational profit-maximizing be-
havior: if detection is unlikely and enforcement is weak, then a com-
pany may perceive a violation to be in its self-interest.  However, the 
literature on organizational irrationality suggests that violations that 
are against a company’s self-interest may also take place.  If corpora-
tions do not always act rationally, then current efforts to change the 
self-interest calculation by increasing sanctions or inculcating norms 
will not suffice to achieve full compliance.  Thus, a comprehensive 
human rights agenda should include assistance to corporations in 
overcoming irrational tendencies. 
Part I of this Note provides an introduction to and an initial cri-
tique of the rational choice model as applied to business and human 
rights.  Part II explores how concepts from the study of organizational 
behavior can shed light on the problem of human rights violations 
by transnational corporations.  Part III uses this nuanced understand-
ing of irrational organizational decisionmaking to evaluate existing 
compliance mechanisms and to suggest ways in which they might be 
improved. 
I.  THE RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL 
The standard rational choice account for corporate misconduct is 
that companies facing competitive pressures “will violate the law to at-
tain desired organizational goals unless the anticipated legal penal-
ties . . . exceed additional benefits the firm could gain by violation.”6  
To the extent that this model explains some proportion of human 
rights violations, the natural response is to seek increased deterrence 
by improving monitoring and strengthening sanctions.7 
Yet scholars have criticized the rational choice model on various le-
vels and across domains.  In corporate law, one complexity to consider 
is that an organization comprises diverse actors with distinct interests, 
making the ideas of a unified purpose and monolithic decisionmaking 
seem implausible.8  Similarly, scholars discuss the role that social 
norms play in individual and group decisionmaking, suggesting that 
corporations may act against their narrow, profit-minded interest and 
in accordance with other values.9  Finally, even if a corporation has a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
6 Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations, 
32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 23, 23 (1998). 
7 See id. at 24. 
8 See Michael B. Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies, 
Problems, and Prospects, 73 GEO. L.J. 1, 16 (1984). 
9 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 22 (1992); David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1811–12 (2001). 
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unified purpose, it, like individuals, can fail to pursue that end in a 
fully rational manner.10  It is the last of these issues, irrational organ-
izational decisionmaking, on which this Note focuses. 
The practical significance of irrationality depends, of course, on the 
extent to which corporations would rationally choose to comply with 
human rights norms.  But this Note’s argument does not depend on a 
particular theory of compliance.  It is possible that strong incentives to 
comply currently exist because corporations have internalized human 
rights norms into their utility function.11  Alternatively, compliance 
with human rights norms could be profit-maximizing behavior, even 
under a narrow definition of self-interest.  Corporations themselves 
have indicated that they consider ethical behavior to be good for busi-
ness,12 and human rights violations trigger both significant reputa-
tional costs and potential litigation expenses.13 
One useful piece of evidence that irrational decisionmaking causes 
human rights violations that might not occur otherwise is the existence 
of violations by companies that are widely regarded to have made 
good-faith commitments to the human rights cause.  Two prominent 
examples include Levi Strauss & Co. and Reebok, both of which have 
been at the forefront of developing human rights codes of conduct but 
continue to struggle with violations.14 
Moreover, to understand how decisions can go wrong, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that human rights violations do not necessarily 
involve binary choices to commit or not to commit.  Rather, the choice 
may be about what sorts of precautions to take.15  For example, Uno-
cal likely could have avoided the harms it ultimately caused in Burma 
by taking precautions such as alternative security arrangements.16  
Undertaking an objective impact assessment “would have demon-
strated to Unocal that the cost of importing or training security paled 
in comparison to the liability incurred from human rights violations.”17  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 See Metzger, supra note 8, at 16–23. 
 11 For an attempt to develop a rational choice model for corporations that incorporates envi-
ronmental norms, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social 
Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2003). 
 12 See U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT & OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R OF HU- 
MAN RIGHTS, EMBEDDING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO BUSINESS PRACTICE 31 (2004), avail- 
able at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/Resources/embedding.pdf 
(quoting statements by business leaders). 
 13 See Tarek F. Maassarani et al., Extracting Corporate Responsibility: Towards a Human 
Rights Impact Assessment, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 135, 159 (2007). 
 14 See Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrère, Enforcing International Labor Rights 
Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663, 686 (1995). 
 15 Even where there is more direct involvement, such as when a manager orders a particular 
action, the decision could still be irrational if the manager miscalculates the corporation’s interest. 
 16 See Maassarani et al., supra note 13, at 163–64. 
 17 Id. at 164. 
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Of course, such steps were not guaranteed to be effective at preven-
tion, and identifying a given choice as irrational requires a determina-
tion of the ex ante probabilities, which are difficult to assign.  Never-
theless, the Unocal example illustrates how an apparently irrational 
choice not to take precautionary steps could lead to complicity in 
costly and unintended human rights violations. 
Of course, isolated instances where violations proved costly do not 
mean that the general incentives for compliance are sufficient.  Exist-
ing compliance mechanisms still lack enforcement measures, and even 
reputational costs and the threat of lawsuits are circumscribed by the 
human rights community’s limited monitoring capacities and litigation 
resources.  An analysis of what the socially optimal level of deterrence 
is, and whether it has been achieved, lies beyond the scope of this 
Note.  Most of the reforms proposed below are intended to be consis-
tent with continued efforts to strengthen deterrence.  The idea driving 
these proposals is twofold.  First, even when the optimal level of deter-
rence has been established, organizational irrationality is an obstacle 
that must be overcome along the way to full compliance.  Second, 
most of the suggested reforms involve less intrusive, more feasible in-
terventions that could have immediate payoffs to the extent that cor-
porations already view compliance as within their self-interest. 
II.  ORGANIZATIONAL IRRATIONALITY 
In an attempt to deepen our understanding of how irrationality 
leads corporations to violate human rights, this Part explores three 
strands of research from the study of organizations.  The first strand 
builds off of research on individual cognition to explain how biases at 
that level might either persist or be aggravated in the organizational 
structure, leading to irrational decisionmaking.  The second strand 
looks at the effect that an organization’s environment has on deci-
sionmaking, and the third focuses on the structure and processes of the 
organization.18 
A.  Cognitive Biases 
Through empirical testing, social scientists have uncovered a broad 
range of cognitive limitations that undermine the rational choice mod-
el.  These findings have led legal scholars to reconsider principles and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 This three-part framework tracks the one used by sociologist Diane Vaughan in her study of 
organizational misconduct.  See Diane Vaughan, The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Mis-
conduct, and Disaster, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 271, 274 (1999).  However, the discussion within each 
of the strands draws on a variety of sources and fields. 
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doctrines that were rooted in that flawed model.19  Research relating 
to cognitive biases in the organizational context suggests that the ap-
plication of the rational choice model to corporate human rights viola-
tions should similarly be reconsidered.  Professor Donald Langevoort 
has identified four biases that are relevant for the present discussion.20 
First, “cognitive conservatism” leads people to interpret informa-
tion in a manner that is consistent with previously held attitudes.21  
When individuals have to work together on teams, the challenges of 
cooperation require further simplification of information.22  Second, 
the optimism bias leads people to overestimate their abilities, and stud-
ies suggest that organizations can exacerbate this tendency,23 because 
they reward optimism in the hiring and promotion processes.24  Third, 
the commitment bias leads people who have committed to a given 
path to interpret subsequently obtained information in a way that rein-
forces their original reasoning.25  Such tendencies are even stronger in 
an organizational context, first because individuals become more in-
vested in positions they have to pitch to others in the organization, and 
then, after a position has been adopted, because “costly implementa-
tion procedures [have been] put in motion.”26  Fourth, the self-serving 
bias leads employees to interpret information in a manner that fur-
thers their personal interests.27  The organization suffers either because  
no one catches their flawed inferences or because other employees 
bring their own self-serving perspectives to complicate or aggravate 
the mistakes.28 
With these four biases on the table, it is possible to develop a story 
for how a corporation can become complicit in a human rights viola-
tion that is not in its rational self-interest.  Consider the paradigmatic 
case of an oil company employing private security forces in a develop-
ing country.  The cognitive conservatism bias might lead individual 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 See, e.g., Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implica-
tions for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1986); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–79 (1998). 
 20 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mis-
lead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997). 
 21 Id. at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22 Id. at 137. 
 23 Id. at 139–40.  But see Jolls et al., supra note 19, at 1525 (suggesting that overoptimism is 
likely to have a smaller effect on firms than on individuals, because “firms that make systematic 
errors in judgment will be at a competitive disadvantage”). 
 24 Langevoort, supra note 20, at 140. 
 25 Id. at 142. 
 26 John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF 
CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13, 21 (David M. Messick & 
Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). 
 27 Langevoort, supra note 20, at 144. 
 28 See id. at 145. 
  
1936  HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:1931  
employees to underestimate the risk of conflict with the local popula-
tion, perhaps because they are aware of a past operation of a similar 
nature that was successful.  The optimism bias might lead the same 
group to overestimate the company’s ability to deal with the risk that 
it had already downplayed, despite knowledge that other companies in 
similar circumstances had been implicated in human rights atrocities.  
Once the team has committed to a course of action on such flawed 
grounds, there could be increasing momentum to resist more negative 
information as it is subsequently attained.  Finally, the self-serving 
bias might color inferences drawn at all three of these levels: the initial 
assessment of risk, the initial evaluation of capabilities, and the con-
tinuing reconsideration of both in light of new information.  This story 
demonstrates that corporations can violate human rights without ever 
making a self-interested decision to do so.  That is, organizations can 
stumble into irrational violations even when they think they are avoid-
ing them. 
B.  Organizational Environment 
The environment of an organization shapes decisionmaking in at 
least two important ways.  First, the organizational culture influences 
an individual’s understanding of the available information and choic-
es.  Sociologist Diane Vaughan explains how, as a result of this “largely 
unconscious cultural knowledge, individuals . . . formulat[e] a defini-
tion of the situation that makes sense of it in cultural terms, so that in 
their view their action is acceptable and nondeviant.”29  The effect of 
culture is related to, and interacts with, the cognitive biases described 
in the previous section.  Both ultimately operate on the level of indi-
vidual decisionmakers; the distinction lies in their origin. 
A second way in which the organizational environment contributes 
to irrationality focuses on group decisionmaking as such.  Psychologist 
Irving Janis coined the term “groupthink” to describe the “mode of 
thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a co-
hesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override 
their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of ac-
tion.”30  Professor Ronald Sims, in elaborating on Janis’s work, identi-
fies factors contributing to groupthink that will often apply in corpo-
rate boardrooms, including “high cohesion, insulation from experts, 
limited methodological search and appraisal procedures, directive 
leadership, and high stress.”31 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 Vaughan, supra note 18, at 280–81. 
 30 IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 9 (2d ed. 1982). 
 31 RONALD R. SIMS, ETHICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 62 (1994). 
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As with organizational culture, the problem of groupthink interacts 
with the effects of individual cognitive biases.  Even when individual 
group members hold reasonable views, group dynamics that suppress 
dissent will lead to less than fully reasoned decisions.  And when 
members bring to the table views that have been distorted by individ-
ual biases, the groupthink theory suggests that the group will fail to 
engage competing interpretations effectively to remove these biases 
and reach the optimal decision.  Even worse, research on group polari-
zation suggests that group discussion in the absence of sufficient view-
point diversity will exacerbate errors in reasoning, leading to more ex-
treme views.32 
The oil company paradigm developed in the previous section can 
be illustrative here as well.  As members of the decisionmaking group 
view information through the lens of their organizational culture, their 
individual biases get filtered through an additional layer of excessive 
confidence in the company’s capacities and deeply held commitment to 
(their perception of) the company’s ends.  For example, an organiza-
tional culture emphasizing competitive advantage can convince indi-
vidual employees that the company is well equipped to overcome risks 
of complicity in human rights violations, while a culture valuing 
growth and opportunity can lead them to be biased in favor of under-
taking a new project.  The problem of groupthink prevents effective 
consideration of alternative ideas or dissenting views and potentially 
results in the group feeling even more confident in its plans — and 
thus less focused on shoring up its risk strategy. 
C.  Organizational Structure and Processes 
Both the cognitive bias and organizational environment explana-
tions for irrationality ultimately point to a discrete decisionmaker mak-
ing an identifiable error.  This third section considers structural defi-
ciencies that prevent organizations from ever putting the necessary 
pieces together.  Just as an individual’s reliance on heuristics could be 
rational “in a global sense,”33 these organizational deficiencies may 
arise from the very structures that make a firm efficient in a macro 
sense.34 
A first structural difficulty identified by the social psychologist 
John Darley is the diffusion of information within an organization.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74 
(2000). 
 33 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ra-
tionality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1085 (2000). 
 34 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Ac-
countability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 417 (2006). 
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Using the example of a harmful product, he explains that an organiza-
tion could have collected all the information it would have needed to 
recognize a risk without any one individual or team putting the pieces 
together.35  The fragmentation of responsibility poses a similar chal-
lenge.  Mistakes could be the product of minor lapses or oversights 
that combine into a major harm that cannot clearly be attributed to 
any one individual or unit.36  
A second set of structural difficulties involves upward and down-
ward communication.  As Professor Kenneth Bamberger explains, an 
efficient firm will have information asymmetries whereby high-level 
managers possess more information about the company’s broad goals, 
while lower-level employees possess more detailed knowledge of the 
issues concerning their subdivisions.37  When it comes to communica-
tion between the two, concerns about information overload might 
“preclude[] charging lower level workers with concern for such low-
frequency but potentially high-risk matters.”38  On the other side, in-
formation working its way upward could be distorted by intermediary 
managers influenced either by unconscious bias or conscious self-
interest.39 
Together, the problems of diffuse information and responsibility 
and incomplete communication create what Vaughan calls “[s]tructural 
secrecy.”40  Structural secrecy is the idea that in an organization, “(a) 
information and knowledge will always be partial and incomplete, (b) 
the potential for things to go wrong increases when tasks or informa-
tion cross internal boundaries, and (c) segregated knowledge minimizes 
the ability to detect and stave off activities that deviate from norma-
tive standards and expectations.”41 
To see how these structural deficiencies could apply in the human 
rights context, consider the paradigmatic case of environmental prac-
tices that threaten a local community’s health or cause permanent 
damage to the residents’ livelihood.  Within the offending corporation, 
information about and responsibility for the environmental practices 
may be diffuse.  Moreover, both upward and downward communica-
tion systems are vulnerable to important failures.  Risk assessments 
and early warning signs considered by lower-level managers might be 
skewed or never make their way to the final decisionmakers.  At the 
same time, goals and priorities established by high-level management 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 Darley, supra note 26, at 17–18. 
 36 See id. at 18. 
 37 Bamberger, supra note 34, at 418. 
 38 Id. at 419. 
 39 Langevoort, supra note 20, at 120. 
 40 Vaughan, supra note 18, at 277. 
 41 Id. 
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might not trickle down effectively to the teams that would actually 
need to implement them.  Thus, environmental human rights abuses 
can take place without any actor within the responsible organization 
ever sitting down to calculate a decision with all the necessary infor-
mation in front of her.  Instead, the problem of structural secrecy can 
lead to an institutional decision, including one against the corpora-
tion’s self-interest, that results in unintended human rights violations. 
D.  Evidence 
To see how these irrational tendencies have operated in a real situa-
tion, consider the parallel issues leading up to the Challenger space 
shuttle launch.  Like a corporation, the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) faced significant pressures to perform, 
making a rational choice explanation of the safety failures appear 
plausible.  Vaughan explains this conventional historical account: 
Underfunded by Congress, the Space Shuttle program depended on in-
come from commercial satellite companies: the greater the number of 
flights per year, the greater the number of commercial payloads, the 
greater the income.  Realizing the importance of schedule (the historically 
accepted explanation went), the managers who were immediately respon-
sible for the decision responded to these pressures by disregarding the ad-
vice of their own engineers, knowingly violating rules about passing safety 
concerns up the hierarchy in the process.42 
That the launch was approved despite significant evidence of risk 
could mean the relevant actors made a self-interested calculation that 
the probable gains outweighed the probable losses — an analogous  
tradeoff to the one corporations face when measuring potential profits 
against human rights risks.  But Vaughan’s in-depth investigation of 
the decisionmaking process shows that the risks were not properly eva-
luated as a result of the irrational tendencies described in the preced-
ing sections. 
Just as a corporation’s employees develop certain cultural under-
standings that influence their information processing, so too did NASA 
employees interpret the level of acceptable risk through their cultural 
lenses.43  In particular, Vaughan notes how “the original technical  
culture of excellence” was affected by “production and cost concerns” 
and “attention to rules and procedures.”44  Despite concerns about data 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 Vaughan, supra note 6, at 36; see also id. at 40 (“Reduced funding had converted the R&D 
space agency into one that operated like a business, complete with production cycles and concerns 
about cost and efficiency.”). 
 43 Vaughan does not discuss individual cognitive biases separately, but one can readily imag-
ine that they were operating in conjunction with the culturally induced distortions that she does 
emphasize. 
 44 Vaughan, supra note 6, at 39. 
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from test missions, the engineers’ attention to cost and scheduling  
prevented them from ordering additional tests.45  At the same time,  
the engineers made sure to conform to all the relevant procedures, 
which provided psychological reassurance that their risk assessments 
were accurate.46  While these errors were being made on the micro-
level, a culture of groupthink prevented dissenters from speaking  
out: “Some people were silent who had information that might have 
altered the outcome.  Some deferred to authority; others, concluding 
that they had not worked on the booster problems recently enough or 
were insufficiently informed for other reasons, kept their insights to 
themselves . . . .”47 
Structural secrecy also played a role.  Early indications of prob-
lems, for example, were not passed up to the top NASA administra-
tors.48  These administrators also lacked the necessary expertise and 
context to evaluate the information that did make it to them.49  Ironi-
cally, NASA had in place a decisionmaking process, Flight Readiness 
Review (FRR), intended to bring “all parts of the organization together 
for risk assessments prior to a launch” and to “uncover flaws in the 
analyses” done by isolated work groups.50  Overwhelmed with infor-
mation about the “60 million component parts,” the FRR members 
could not meaningfully challenge the conclusions that were presented 
to them, and the risk assessment of the problematic component was 
“affirmed up the hierarchy.”51 
In addition to providing real-world evidence by analogy, the Chal-
lenger example illustrates the sort of case study that would help con-
firm the role played by irrational decisionmaking in corporate human 
rights violations.  Interviews with the relevant actors, combined with 
documents from the original point of profit and risk assessment, could 
establish whether a corporation was complicit in a human rights viola-
tion against its self-interest.  The same information could help deter-
mine what roles were played by individual cognitive biases, orga-
nizational culture, and deficient structures and processes.  Moreover, 
broader surveys are necessary to determine the extent of the problem.  
One small study of noncompliance with environmental regulations, for 
example, confirmed that communications difficulties between employ-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 Id. at 41. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 45. 
 48 Diane Vaughan, Regulating Risk: Implications of the Challenger Accident, in ORGANIZA-
TIONS, UNCERTAINTIES, AND RISK 235, 240 (James F. Short, Jr. & Lee Clarke eds., 1992). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Vaughan, supra note 6, at 42. 
 51 Id. at 43. 
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ees were one root cause of noncompliance.52  A much more systematic 
study tailored to the causes of organizational irrationality would be a 
worthwhile next step. 
III.  EVALUATING THE EXISTING MECHANISMS  
FOR COMPLIANCE 
Influenced either directly or indirectly by the rational choice model, 
evaluations of the existing efforts to promote corporate human rights 
compliance focus on enforcement mechanisms.  Enhancing enforce-
ment procedures, such as reporting obligations and sanctions, is no 
doubt an essential part of increasing the weight given to compliance in 
a corporation’s self-interest calculation.  But developing these proce-
dures for optimal effectiveness requires attention to the features of or-
ganizational irrationality discussed in Part II.  Moreover, an examina-
tion of organizational irrationality reveals that other steps may be just 
as important. 
This Part will analyze the implications of organizational irrational-
ity for soft law and civil litigation.  A lack of empirical validation 
should not preclude consideration of at least some of the more modest 
reforms this Note will propose.  Because many of the suggested inter-
ventions are less intrusive than what human rights advocates are cur-
rently seeking, they should be more palatable to the business commu-
nity, and because most can be undertaken without interfering with 
efforts to strengthen deterrence through enforcement, the cost of ex-
perimenting with them is low.53 
A.  Soft Law 
1.  Overview. — Soft law is generally understood to encompass 
nonbinding norms that govern behavior.54  International soft law in-
struments can take a number of forms: resolutions and other pro-
nouncements by international bodies, joint statements of intent issued 
by states, codes of conduct developed by an industry, guidelines 
drafted by expert groups, and more.55  Even if not legally binding, soft 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 52 EPA & CHEM. MFRS. ASS’N, DOC. NO. EPA-305-R-99–001, EPA/CMA ROOT CAUSE 
ANALYSIS PILOT PROJECT 24 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/ 
publications/assistance/sectors/rootcauseanalysis.pdf. 
 53 It is conceivable that some of the irrationality mechanisms could operate in the other direc-
tion — for example, overoptimism about the reputational gains that follow from human rights 
compliance efforts.  The proposals here could presumably be tailored to avoid interfering with 
any such pro–human rights tendencies.  A separate project might consider ways to harness those 
tendencies to achieve additional human rights gains. 
 54 See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 
93 (2d ed. 2006). 
 55 See id. at 94. 
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law is “routinely invoked . . . to challenge nonconforming behavior.”56  
The discussion here will focus on three categories of soft law that 
could be used to regulate corporate conduct in the context of human 
rights: standards set by intergovernmental organizations, principles 
developed through multistakeholder initiatives, and codes of conduct.  
The examples provided are far from exhaustive, but they illustrate the 
relevant challenges and opportunities. 
(a)  Intergovernmental Organizations. — The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provided an early 
attempt to regulate corporate human rights behavior, among other 
practices, when it adopted the Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises in 1976.57  Amended in 2000, the OECD Guidelines provide 
“non-binding recommendations by governments to multinational en-
terprises operating in or from the 33 adhering countries.”58  The 
Guidelines begin by enumerating fundamental principles.  Enterprises 
are expected to “[r]espect the human rights of those affected by their 
activities consistent with the host government’s international obliga-
tions and commitments.”59  Within the specific subject areas, the 
Guidelines provide both benchmarks60 and detailed procedural princi-
ples.61  As often happens with soft law instruments, enforcement 
mechanisms have started to emerge based on the standards enunciated 
in the Guidelines.  For example, complaints can now be brought 
against firms operating within the Guidelines’ jurisdiction for nonjudi-
cial review by a National Contact Point.62 
The more recent U.N. Global Compact represents an effort to in-
volve more companies by offering vaguer principles.  The Global 
Compact is a voluntary initiative that focuses on “norm diffusion and 
the dissemination of practical know-how and tools”63 without develop-
ing new law per se.64  It includes just two principles under the human 
rights heading: “[1] Businesses should support and respect the protec-
tion of internationally proclaimed human rights; and [2] make sure 
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 57 See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 
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that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.”65  But it also goes 
on to enumerate environmental principles and labor goals, such as the 
elimination of child labor and employment discrimination.66 
The Global Compact was designed to create a framework for 
“leadership, dialogue, learning, partnership projects, and network/out- 
reach.”67  As with the OECD Guidelines, a complaint mechanism has 
recently been introduced.68  The Global Compact Office (GCO) for-
wards registered complaints to a corporation accused of wrongdoing, 
and although the GCO takes no position on the merits, it reserves the 
right to remove the corporation from a public list of participants for 
failures to engage in a dialogue on the complaint.69  This mechanism 
represents a first step in the direction of placing pressures on partici-
pants, but critics continue calling for, at the least, “a minimum social 
compliance threshold for participation.”70 
(b)  Multistakeholder Initiatives. — Efforts in this category involve 
cooperation among corporations, states, and civil society organiza-
tions.71  They are often centered on a particular industry, facilitating 
the development of more detailed sets of principles.  In that sense, 
these initiatives constitute an improvement on the approaches taken 
by intergovernmental organizations, which succeeded mainly in setting 
out more abstract ideals. 
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (the Prin-
ciples) address the specific problems that corporations in the extractive 
sector have had with human rights violations by their security forces.  
The Principles first provide a series of factors that companies should 
consider in assessing risk, ranging from the human rights records of 
the prospective security forces to patterns of conflict within the local 
communities.72  Next, the Principles cover issues pertaining to compa-
nies’ relationships with public security forces.  Emphasis is placed on 
communication, training, and transparency, as well as on reporting 
human rights violations and proactively monitoring their investiga-
tions.73  For private security forces, the Principles require greater over-
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sight on the use of force.  They include a proportionality requirement 
and draw a distinction between preventative and defensive force on 
the one hand and offensive force on the other.74  The Principles even 
cover terms of the contract, suggesting that termination be permitted 
upon discovery of unlawful behavior75 and that the security providers 
be “representative of the local population.”76 
The Voluntary Principles have been adopted by many of the major 
players in the extractive sector,77 and many NGOs signed on to show 
their support.78  In addition to the significant level of detail, the Prin-
ciples are distinctive for their emphasis on providing how-to guidelines 
rather than taking a more aspirational approach.79  Such guidelines 
enable participating companies to operationalize their commitments 
more readily.80  Early evidence suggests that corporations are at least 
taking the Principles into account.81  Nevertheless, as with all volun-
tary initiatives, lack of enforcement remains the primary concern. 
(c)  Codes of Conduct. — Codes of conduct can be developed by 
industries, NGOs, and individual companies.  The number of com-
pany codes has been estimated at around a thousand,82 and industry 
associations ranging from toy manufacturers83 to chemical producers84 
have developed instruments as well.  NGOs such as Amnesty Interna-
tional have developed suggested guidelines85 that companies can either 
adopt wholesale or use as the starting point for their own codes. 
As compared with other forms of soft law, codes of conduct may be 
especially attractive to companies because of their even greater flexibil-
ity.  Conversely, compliance may be especially difficult to enforce by 
external monitors, raising the concern that corporations reap reputa-
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tional benefits from the promulgation of their codes and are left with 
minimal incentives to comply.86  In practice, codes of conduct devel-
oped by individual companies run the full gamut as far as specificity 
and accountability are concerned.  Professor Joshua Newberg distin-
guishes between “values statement[s]” at one end of the spectrum and 
compliance-driven codes at the other, while recognizing that many 
codes are hybrids that incorporate elements of both.87  Codes of con-
duct often contain voluntary reporting elements, which constitute one 
step in the direction of greater accountability.88 
2.  Analysis. — When organizational irrationality is factored in, soft 
law takes on greater significance in the effort to reduce corporate hu-
man rights violations.  Most would likely agree that attracting greater 
participation through flexibility is desirable, because participation 
forces corporations to think seriously about human rights and fosters 
dialogue among the various stakeholders.  But those who stress the 
push toward greater enforcement and hard law status might overlook 
the important role that soft law can play in counteracting groupthink 
and cognitive biases.  By bringing human rights concerns to the fore-
front, soft law should make corporate decisionmakers more attentive 
to competing considerations and thus more likely to make rights-
protective choices.  The push for compliance need not detract from 
this role played by soft law, but it can — if overly adversarial tactics 
disrupt the ongoing dialogue.  For example, Professor Steven Ratner 
has noted the concern that NGOs can “fall prey to a visceral anti–
[transnational enterprise] bias” that can obstruct cooperation.89  Hu-
man rights advocates should, at the least, be aware of this tradeoff.  It 
may not be worth pursuing enforcement at the cost of losing both co-
operation and the irrationality-correcting functions of soft law. 
In addition to its general debiasing effect, soft law could further the 
human rights cause through three particular strategies proposed below.  
Each is driven both by attention to organizational irrationality and a 
pragmatic awareness of the interests on the corporations’ side. 
(a)  Operational Guidelines vs. Value Statements or Benchmarks. 
— It is perhaps intuitive that how-to guidelines would enhance com-
pliance better than abstract value statements would.  But the discus-
sion in Part II demonstrates why the need for the former is particu-
larly acute.  The kinds of vague principles contained in instruments 
such as the Global Compact need at some point to be translated into 
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concrete instructions.  If that translation takes place from within the 
organization, the irrational tendencies discussed earlier are liable to 
hinder effective action.  Thus, human rights advocates should help es-
tablish how-to guidelines that are as specific as possible.  The Volun-
tary Principles offer one of the best illustrations of this approach. 
Some advocates would prefer to concentrate efforts on promoting 
accountability through benchmarks and minimum compliance stan-
dards.90  Both approaches are worth pursuing; the major question is 
which to prioritize.  Because corporations are more likely to resist 
benchmarks than operational guidelines, the human rights community 
might do well to make immediate inroads on the latter while continu-
ing to negotiate the former. 
(b)  Reporting/Monitoring vs. Impact Assessments. — One of the 
most basic steps that a corporation can take toward better compliance 
is to agree to self-reporting.  Commentators have pressed for this strat-
egy as a way to strengthen codes of conduct.91  The obvious concern 
about self-reporting is that corporations can consciously skew their in-
formation.  Fear of reputational harms and lawsuits might make such 
attempts quite rational, particularly if there is no obligation to report 
accurately.  The less obvious concern is that there may also be unin-
tentional distortion.  Each of the four cognitive biases discussed in this 
Note makes individual employees vulnerable to misinterpretation of 
information.  So too might structural secrecy interfere with the accu-
rate assembling of that information. 
Monitoring by an external party would constitute an improvement 
over self-reporting, but corporations are even less inclined to agree to 
it.92  Moreover, there is something of a dilemma in deciding how best 
to situate the monitoring party.  On the one hand, if the monitoring 
group is too far removed, its effectiveness is limited by the accuracy of 
the information it gets.  On the other hand, if the monitoring group 
becomes too closely involved with the people or entities being moni-
tored, then it is liable to begin seeing information through the same bi-
ased lens.93 
One way to avoid this dilemma is to have an external monitor in-
tervene earlier.  The underlying strategy is the same one involved in 
shifting toward operational guidelines: to help an organization reason 
clearly before the various biases can cloud a final determination.  In-
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stead of demanding greater reporting obligations, human rights advo-
cates should ask corporations to commit to developing action plans 
and risk assessments before they begin new projects.  The very act of 
developing such plans for an external audience might have a debiasing 
effect by forcing the company to step outside its groupthink tendencies 
and uncover any information hidden by structural secrecy.  Moreover, 
human rights advocates can help to recognize and correct for any bi-
ased inferences drawn by members of the organization.  Commentators 
have used similar justifications in support of environmental impact as-
sessments,94 and others have used the relative success of this approach 
in the environmental context to argue for the potential value of human 
rights impact assessments.95 
Finally, a practical advantage of emphasizing earlier intervention is 
that corporations may be more likely to cooperate.  The cost of doing 
such assessments may be significant, but should not be prohibitive.96  
And whereas committing to reporting or monitoring makes corpora-
tions uneasy about prospective liability or reputational harms, releas-
ing information and accepting feedback prior to the beginning of a 
project should seem much less risky.  Of course, corporations may still 
be reluctant to subject their plans to scrutiny of any sort, and it is un-
clear how open they will be to implementing suggestions.  Neverthe-
less, these are challenges that effective cooperation over time can help 
to overcome. 
(c)  Counteracting Optimism. — While the preceding subsections 
have considered ways to optimize the conditions for more rational de-
cisionmaking, one can also imagine counteracting one set of biases by 
drawing on another set of cognitive tendencies.  Soft law approaches to 
reducing corporate human rights violations might benefit from two 
more proactive interventions to offset the optimism bias.97  The first 
involves the availability heuristic, which refers to the tendency people 
have to over- or underestimate probabilities based on examples that 
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stick out in their minds.98  Bringing the realities of human rights viola-
tions to the attention of corporate decisionmakers, and thus making 
them more “available,” might be one way to overcome the optimism 
bias that might otherwise skew their reasoning.  Human rights advo-
cates should spend more time bringing these stories to life, through 
film, photography, and personal testimony,99 and should find ways to 
bring this evidence directly into the consciousness of their business 
counterparts.  Even as human rights advocates push for stronger 
monitoring and tougher penalties, they should not overlook the poten-
tial significance of less intrusive interventions.  They might request, 
for example, that business leaders commit to basic employee training 
that includes a component that dramatically showcases past human 
rights failures. 
Another way to counteract the optimism bias is the strategic use of 
“framing” effects, which describe how people respond differently de-
pending on how information is presented.100  One example is loss aver-
sion, which is the idea that “people tend to weigh losses more heavily 
than gains in evaluating potential outcomes.”101  In light of that fact, 
advocates seeking to make the “business case” for human rights may 
want to emphasize potential harms rather than potential gains.  This 
could mean helping to calculate the costs of litigation for sued corpora-
tions or performing the more difficult task of helping to translate repu-
tational harms into concrete dollar figures.  By sharpening the pros-
pects for loss and putting them at the forefront of corporate 
decisionmakers’ attention, advocates could help those decisionmakers 
factor in human rights concerns at something closer to the objectively 
accurate level.  Continuing to tout the reputational gains that come 
with good corporate citizenship might be valuable over the long term 
in inculcating norms, but capitalizing on loss aversion appears to be an 
underutilized strategy.  This missed opportunity is all the more signifi-
cant because it means that while human rights advocates seek stronger 
deterrence measures, they are failing to make the most of the potential 
for existing incentive structures to foster compliance through the 
mechanism of framing.102 
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B.  Civil Litigation 
1.  Overview. — As countries ratify the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court103 and incorporate its provisions into domestic 
law, the number of available jurisdictions for charging transnational 
corporations with international crimes is on the rise.104  In the United 
States, the Alien Tort Statute105 (ATS) has provided a vehicle for in-
ternational human rights claims.  Since Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,106 cor-
porations have been vulnerable to civil suits for complicity in human 
rights violations.  The Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain107 
left this door open without actually deciding the question of whether 
private defendants can be sued under the ATS.108 
Neither business nor human rights advocates are completely satis-
fied with the ATS.  Business groups, of course, oppose its very exis-
tence because it creates a risk of liability they otherwise would not 
face.109  They argue that unpredictable liability will deter them from 
investing in foreign countries.110  Human rights groups, for their part, 
encounter a number of obstacles in their attempts to sue corporations 
under the statute.  Courts have frequently dismissed such claims on act 
of state, comity, or political question grounds, thus never reaching the 
merits of the cases.111 
Moreover, both sides have reason to be concerned about two ambi-
guities that Sosa left unresolved.  First, although Sosa provided guid-
ance on the type of violation that would create a cause of action under 
the ATS,112 the standard was open-ended enough that lower courts 
have not applied it in a predictable fashion.113  Second, Sosa did not 
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involve “aiding and abetting” liability and thus provided no relevant 
guidance.  Lower courts have therefore continued to struggle with ba-
sic questions, such as whether international law or federal common 
law supplies the standard, and what level of involvement is required 
under each.114  Until these issues are clarified, corporations might be 
deterred from socially desirable investments for fear of being held li-
able for far-removed harms.115  At the same time, human rights advo-
cates will have a difficult time planning an efficient allocation of their 
scarce resources in the face of inconsistent judicial rulings.116 
2.  Analysis. — From the human rights perspective, one general 
concern about litigation as a strategy is that it could undermine the 
cooperative relationship that the analysis in the previous section priori-
tized.  Of course, it does not follow that litigation should be discarded 
as a component of the broader strategy.  Indeed, the threat of such pri-
vate litigation is an important deterrent that must remain available in 
the absence of, for example, a full-fledged international criminal law 
regime.  But the human rights community should recognize that litiga-
tion is not only an incomplete tool,117 but also one that can undermine 
other efforts. 
An analysis that incorporates organizational irrationality might also 
point toward a more surprising proposition — that narrowing the 
scope of the ATS may be in the interests of human rights advocates.  
In calculating the potential costs of human rights violations, corpora-
tions might not only misinterpret information about their likely com-
plicity, but also underestimate the risk of enforcement against them.  
The self-serving bias, for example, may lead corporations to underes-
timate the likelihood of detection.  Structural secrecy may prevent 
lawyers, who are in the best position to assess the litigation risk, from 
effectively preparing the organization to avoid hazards and from re-
ceiving warning signals from the frontlines. 
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Uncertainty in the law makes even a fully rational calculation im-
precise, but it also seems likely to feed into and exacerbate the prob-
lems created by the self-serving bias118 and structural secrecy,119 poten-
tially obstructing efforts within an organization to further the cause of 
compliance.  Thus, if the ultimate goal is to prevent human rights 
abuses, then helping corporations better predict their risk of liability 
should be a positive step.120  Instead of categorically rejecting calls to 
amend the ATS,121 or resting their hopes on the development of ac-
commodating case law, human rights advocates should consider ways 
in which statutory reforms could further their purposes and should 
work with the business community to seek common ground. 
This Note is not the place for a full-fledged proposal for reform of 
the ATS, but one particular goal must be emphasized.  To fulfill the 
need for clarity, a new statute should specify standards for aiding and 
abetting liability and the particular violations that federal courts can 
adjudicate.  Both of these issues will be extremely controversial, but 
settling them should be in the interests of both the human rights and 
business communities.  Settlement enables better planning by both 
sides,122 first of all, but more relevant to the problem of irrationality, 
settlement in these two most uncertain areas can also help prevent the 
set of human rights violations that corporations would have unwit-
tingly committed against their self-interest. 
Because reforming the ATS, unlike the proposals outlined earlier, 
raises significant potential costs, more empirical assessment is required 
before any steps should be taken.  It will be important to estimate 
what proportion of violations occurs because of uncertainty in the law, 
whether exacerbated by one of the mechanisms of irrationality or not.  
The gains from increased compliance and other potentially beneficial 
reforms123 must then be weighed against any increase in violations be-
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cause of changes to the statute’s deterrent effect.  On balance, the costs 
might outweigh the benefits depending on the precise changes pro-
posed, but that assessment cannot be made unless both sides engage 
and see what compromises can be reached. 
The irrationality analysis itself points toward one possible com-
promise.  To find aiding and abetting liability, courts have generally 
required corporations to have acted with knowledge or purpose.124  
Yet both standards may lead to only limited deterrence if cognitive 
bias and structural secrecy prevent the proper evaluation of risk.  
Thus, human rights advocates should urge a negligence theory of li-
ability to incentivize corporations to take steps to counteract irrational-
ity.125  In return, corporations might demand the inclusion of a safe 
harbor provision that applies when they take certain steps, such as en-
gaging in an impact assessment before beginning a project and follow-
ing through on the assessment’s recommendations.  Such a compro-
mise has the potential to be a win for both sides if it results both in a 
reduced number of human rights violations and in improved predict-
ability for corporations. 
CONCLUSION 
The first goal of this Note is to identify concerns about organiza-
tional irrationality as an obstacle to improving corporate human rights 
compliance.  The prevalence of these irrational tendencies may be 
presently unclear, but addressing them will only become increasingly 
important as other efforts to develop the rational and normative cases 
for compliance succeed.  Although further empirical research into the 
extent of these problems will be necessary to guide the appropriate re-
sponse, this Note also lays out some possible reforms to begin the con-
versation.  At least some of the proposed interventions warrant imme-
diate consideration because of their relatively low cost.  But all of the 
suggestions are motivated by a common spirit of pragmatism that rec-
ognizes where second-best solutions are worth adopting and compro-
mises are worth pursuing. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 124 Nemeroff, supra note 114, at 255. 
 125 Cf. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 158 (making a similar argument for securities regulation). 
